Abstract-Named Data Network (NDN) is one of the future Internet architecture, all nodes (i.e., hosts, routers) are allowed to have a local cache, used to satisfy incoming requests for content. However, depending on caching allows an adversary to perform attacks that are very effective and relatively easy to implement, such as content pollution attack. In this paper, we use a method of secure network coding based on homomorphic signature system to solve this problem. Firstly, we use a dynamic public key technique, our scheme for each generation authentication without updating the initial secret key used. Secondly, employing the homomorphism of hash function, intermediate node and destination node verify the signature of the received message. In addition, when the network topology of NDN is simple and fixed, the code coefficients in our scheme are generated in a pseudorandom number generator in each node, so the distribution of the coefficients is also avoided. In short, our scheme not only can efficiently prevent against Intra/Inter-GPAs, but also can against the content poisoning attack in NDN.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasingly rich of applications and calculation modes, and with the enhancement of the social dependence on the Internet, Internet access and network function orientation has undergone tremendous change. In terms of scalability, mobility and security, TCP / IP architecture has been unable to satisfy the requirements of sustainable development of the Internet. Therefore, in order to better serve the future Internet, researchers trying to redesign the existing Internet architecture, and propose the Future Internet Architecture (FIA) [1] .
Named Data Network (NDN) [2] , [3] is one of the future Internet architecture, now is considered as a viable replacement for the current IP-based Internet, which uses the methods of name-based routing, forwarding and caching to optimize network transmission efficiency. In NDN, there is not the concept of connection, only the content publishers and content consumers. Content publishers need to encrypt and sign the content, content consumers need to decrypt and verify legal content. Moreover, all nodes (i.e., hosts, routers) are allowed to have a local cache, used to satisfy incoming requests for content. This makes NDN a good architecture for efficient large scale content distribution. However, depending on caching allows an adversary to perform attacks that are very effective and relatively easy to implement, such as content pollution attack [4] , [5] .
In theory, content signatures provide an effective and simple means for detecting content poisoning attacks in NDN [6] , [7] . Currently, most of the signature algorithm are based on homomorphic hashing function.For example, Korhn et al. [8] using homomorphic hash function to construct the verification algorithm for the first time. However, the total size of the hash values of the scheme is proportional to the number of blocks, which could be very large and the cryptographic hash function is computationally expensive. Li et al. [9] employed a batch content distribution verification scheme, which reduced the computational cost of each node. Unfortunately, their scheme unable to realize the network max-flow and can bring delay to the sinks. Zhao et al. [10] from the perspective of linear space, presented a lower computational complexity signature scheme, but their scheme required long start-up latency. Yu et al. [11] proposed an RSA-based scheme, which firstly used the homomorphism hash function to calculate the hash value of the source message, then used RSA algorithm to calculate signature of the hash value, then send message with signature. Rosario et al. [12] improved the Yu's scheme, they designed the RSA-based homomorphic signature scheme in integer field, and used the random oracle model to prove the security of the scheme.
With the deepening of the research, researchers found that the schemes of all the above only designed to prevent against Intra-Generation Pollution Attacks (intra-GPAs) do not work well for multiple generation propagations. In the case of multiple generation propagations, these schemes may exsit inter-Generation Pollution Attacks (inter-GPAs). The so-called inter-GPAs, refers to that an adversary can take advantage of a valid message W of the k-th generation, to act as the message of the k+i-th generation. Because this message does not belong to the k+i-th generation, so it is clearly a fake content. But the signature of this message is calculated by the source (calculated in the k -th generation), so this message can passed the verification of intermediate nodes, so that it can successfully forge a message of the k+i-th generation, and destroy the transmission of the k+i-th generation message Guangjun L. et al. [13] used the dynamic public key technique, proposed a novel homomorphic signature scheme, in which the source does not update the system key frequently. This scheme can defeat Intra-GPAs and Inter-GPAs effectively.
In practice, however, the overhead of signature verification is a challenge in NDN router. The ref. [5] and [7] also show that the traditional signature verification have a high requirements of the router interface and computing power. So, when we choose signature scheme, not only consider the security, but also consider the overhead. The ref. [14] presented a network coding signature algorithm of low communication overhead, which made the signature as redundant added into the source messages, then hashed the padded messages to the public parameters. This scheme has a lower communication overhead than other schemes. However, this method designed to prevent against Intra-GPAs, do not work well for multiple generations.
Inspired by the idea of ref. [13] and ref. [14] , we propose a novel method with low communication overhead, particularly, that can efficiently prevent against Intra/Inter-GPAs. Eventually, we apply this method to named data network (NDN), to solve the content poisoning attack in NDN. Firstly, we use a dynamic public key technique, our scheme for each generation authentication without updating the initial secret key used. Secondly, employing the homomorphism of hash function, intermediate node and destination node verify the signature of the received message. In addition, when the network topology of NDN is simple and fixed, the code coefficients in our scheme are generated in a pseudorandom number generator in each node, so the distribution of the coefficients is also avoided.
II. HOMOMORPHIC HASH FUNCTION
Currently, most of the homomorphic signature algorithm are based on homomorphic hash function, Korhn et al. [8] using homomorphic hash function to construct the verification algorithm for the first time. The homomorphic hash function is as follows:
A trusted party globally generates a set of hash parameters G = (p, q, g), where p and q are two large random primes such that 1 |  p q . The hash parameter g is a 1×n row-vector, composed of random elements of F p , all order q. That is, ) , ,
Let h 1 , h 2 ,…, h m denote the hash value for messages V 1 , V 2 ,…, V m , that is the hash value for messages V 1 , V 2 ,…, V m , is generated as follows:
This hash function is homomorphic. It has the additive homomorphism, because for arbitrary
Therefore, for arbitrary network node receives a message W = (w 1 ,…, w n ), α 1 
III. NDN CONTENT POISONING ATTACK
This section describes content poisoning attack scenarios. Content poisoning is an attack whereby adversary injects fake content into router caches. To be specific, the adversary attempts to inject fake content or modify the contents of the transmission in NDN, which will seriously interfere with the communications between the publisher and the receiver, in order to destroy the integrity of the content package. The purpose of this attack is to make the legitimate nodes can't identify the false content in the NDN. Due to the transmission mode of NDN, these polluted contents will be continuously spread, so that make the whole network traffic is contaminated.
In this paper, we consider a pro-active content poisoning, i.e., the adversary introducing malicious data into the contents, and injects fake content with the same name into router caches. Fake content can be injected into the network via malicious routers or end-nodes. For example, consider an adversary targeting a specific router R. Assuming that malicious producer sends a fake content to R which is promptly cached. Consequently, R is pre-polluted with fake content. If the router R receives a real interest, it would send the fake content.
IV. SECURE NETWORK CODING AGAINST CONTENT POISONING ATTACKS IN NDN
In this paper, we consider a NDN network topology as shown in Fig. 1 . It consists of A, t 1 ,…, t k and a number of forwarders, where A and t 1 ,…, t k can be content publisher and content receiver in NDN. To facilitate the description, in this paper, A is a content publisher, t 1 ,…, t k are multiple content receivers. Content publishers produced messages in the form of the following: In this paper, our secure network coding based on homomorphic signature is mainly composed of four parts: Setup, Sign, Combine and Verify. 
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To generate the signature tag using the secret key for the i-th basis vector 
l is code coefficients which are generated by the seed α X of the node X received (as show in Fig. 1) , and X send the seeds and message packets υ to all descending node. 
B. Security
In this section, we show that our scheme is secure against Intra/Inter-GPAs respectively. First, we define the contaminated message: We prove the security of this algorithm in two ways as follows. Next, we will prove the security of this algorithm for Intra-GPAs and Inter-GPAs. Obviously, if we want to compute w n , we still solve the discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, the adversary  cannot construct a message 
D. The Security for Inter-GPAs
The adversary  can take advantage of a valid message W of the k-th generation, to act as the message of the k+i-th generation. Because this message does not belong to the k+i-th generation, so it is clearly a fake content. But the signature of this message is calculated by the source (calculated in the k-th generation), so this message can passed the verification of intermediate nodes, so that it can successfully forge a message of the k+i-th generation, and destroy the transmission of the k+i-th generation message. Next, we will prove this method does not pose a threat for our scheme.
We consider a message W of the k-th generation, where 
If an adversary  take advantage of this message W of the k-th generation, to forge a message of the id-th generation, assume that the private key of the id-th generation i.e., the message W cannot be verified.
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In conclusion, our scheme is secure against Intra/InterGPAs respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some researches [5] - [7] shows that the signature is an effective means to solve the content poisoning attack in NDN. In this paper, we try to integrating network coding to NDN, using a secure network coding method which is based on homomorphic signature to solve a potential attackscontent poisoning attack in NDN, while enhancing the data transmission efficiency, improve the security of network data. Of course, we proved content signatures provide an effective means to detect content poisoning attack only in theoretically.
Currently NDN network and network coding have carried out extensive research coding in theory and practice [15] - [18] , and have confirmed from the theoretical model that using network coding can improve network performance, but the verification steps or simulated environment, mostly based on assumptions or idealized model still have a gap with the actual application environment, so some conclusions have limitations. In addition, the process is mostly quantitative research. Therefore, building application evaluation model and practical system under NDN network combined with NC, remains to be further researched.
